As a fundraising method, Initial Coin Offering (ICO) has raised billions of dollars for thousands of startups in the past two years. Existing ICO mechanisms place more emphasis on the short-term benefits of maximal fundraising while ignoring the problem of unbalanced token allocation, which negatively impacts subsequent fundraising and has bad effects on introducing new investors and resources. We propose a new ICO mechanism which uses the concept of Gini index for the very first time as a mechanism design constraint to control allocation inequality. Our mechanism maintains an elegant and straightforward structure. It allows the agents to modify their bids as a price discovery process, while limiting the bids of whales. We analyze the agents' equilibrium behaviors under our mechanism. Under natural technical assumptions, we show that most agents have simple dominant strategies and the equilibrium revenue approaches the optimal revenue asymptotically in the number of agents. We verify our mechanism using real ICO dataset we collected, and confirm that our mechanism performs well in terms of both allocation fairness and revenue.
Introduction
As a primary fundraising tool for startups, Initial Coin Offering (ICO) is very eye-catching in the capital market. According to [4] , 718 ICOs ended in 2017 and raised around 10 billions (USD) in total. By 2018, the ICO fundraising market has grown significantly. The total fundraising for the year reached 11.5 billions (USD), and the number of ended ICOs increased to 2517.
Despite the popularity and the huge amounts of funds being raised, popular ICO mechanisms are surprisingly unsophisticated. Vitalik Buterin [1] analyzed some token sale models and claimed that an optimal token sale model has not been discovered yet. There are two commonly used ICO mechanisms. One is simply the fixed price mechanism. There are two variants of this mechanism: uncapped sales and capped sales. Uncapped sales does not limit the number of coins sold. The aim is to accept as much capital and as many investors into the project as possible. Capped sales sells a fixed number of coins, and cuts off additional investment once all coins are sold. The fixed price mechanism does not offer a price discovery process. Many cryptocurrencies released via ICOs have different degrees of appreciation after their tokens are listed on exchanges. The average ICO is under priced by 8.2% [5] , while some tokens are appreciated by more than 1000% [8] . Another commonly used mechanism is the Dutch auction, which offers a much better price discovery process. It starts the auction with a high price, which keeps decreasing until enough participants are willing to purchase all coins according to the market price. The Dutch auction also has its drawbacks. E.g., it requires the participants actively monitor the auction progress.
For both the fixed price mechanism with capped sales and the Dutch auction, whales (large investors) can end the auction early by putting in large investments, which takes away the investment opportunities from the smaller investors. Wealth inequality is a significant problem in the cryptocurrency community, which goes against the principle of decentralization, especially if the coin is based on proof-of-stake (that favors richer holders). It is also worth mentioning that the tokens sold in an ICO normally amount to no more than 50% of the tokens. The unsold tokens are still in the hands of the • The Gini mechanism offers a price discovery process. We believe any mechanism that asks for a valuation is not realistic for ICOs. Before an ICO starts, the agents have difficulty in the valuation of the coin. The value of a cryptocurrency depends heavily on its popularity. The Gini mechanism only asks for the agents' budgets (i.e., how much do you plan to invest). Based on the budgets, the mechanism calculates a price. The Gini mechanism has the property that it produces higher prices if there are higher budgets and more agents. That is, the more popular the coin is, the higher the price gets. During the running of the mechanism, the agents have the ability to adjust their budgets. For example, if the price is too high for an agent, then she could pull out (reduce her budget to 0). If the price gets too low, then the agent would max out her investment (honestly report her maximum budget). We show that a pure strategy ( 1 , 2 , . . . , n )-equilibrium exists. Under this equilibrium, agent i is playing a pure strategy (offering a single budget) and this is at most i away from her best response in terms of utility. The i depend on the actual data. In our experiments, the i are always tiny compared to the agents' maximum budgets.
• For most of the agents, the strategies are straight-forward. They either max out their budgets or completely pull out of the investment. Only a handful of agents have room for calculated equilibrium behaviors -they face the situations where investing too much results in a price that is too high, while investing too little results in little utility gain. A carefully chosen budget can create a nice balance between the price increment and her marginal utility gain.
• The mechanism produces nearly optimal revenue in experiments. In terms of theoretical guarantee, asymptotically (when the number of agents goes to infinity), under natural technical assumptions, the mechanism's revenue converges to the optimal revenue.
As a last but not least contribution of this paper, we plan to release our collected dataset, which can be used to analyze user behaviors in ICOs and for agent-based simulations of ICOs. For convenience, in our datasets, all monetary amounts are provided in both Ether and USD, based on real-time exchange rate at the time of the transactions. Our dataset consists of six popular ICOs, collected according to the following selection rules:
Rule 1: More than 10 millions (USD) raised.
Rule 2:
Using the Dutch auction as the ICO model.
Rule 3:
The number of transactions is more than 500.
Model Description
The unit size of digital currencies tend to be tiny. For example, satoshi is the name for the smallest unit of bitcoin, which equals one hundred millionth of a bitcoin. In our model, we treat coins as infinitely divisible, which allows us to normalize the number of coins to 1. That is, we are selling one divisible item (one coin) to n agents. For presentation purposes, we say that agent i receives a i coin (0 ≤ a i ≤ 1) if she receives a i fraction of the coin. Agent i's type is denoted as
where v i is her valuation for the coin 1 and b i is her budget. For now, we defer any discussion on the difference between an agent's private true budget limit and her reported budget limit. We will discuss the agents' strategies in Section 4.
Since we are selling currencies, we believe all agents should face the same exchange rate. In an ICO mechanism, the agents would pay monetary payments (e.g., USD or other cryptocurrencies like Ether) in exchange of a fraction of the coin. Let i and j be two agents, each receiving a i and a j coin, and each paying c i and c j . We should have ci ai = cj aj . This exchange ratio can also be interpreted as the price of the coin. Essentially, we require that our mechanism offers the same price p to all agents. If we charge c from an agent, then this agent should receive c p coin. For agent i, having a budget of b i does not necessarily mean that the mechanism will charge her exactly b i . Let c i be agent i's actual spending under the mechanism. The budget constraint is 0 ≤ c i ≤ b i . Agent i receives ci p coin and her utility equals
The agents aim to maximize their utilities. Again, we defer any discussion on strategies to Section 4.
A mechanism outputs the price p and an allocation (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ). a i ≥ 0 for all i and a i = 1. An allocation is feasible only if it honours the budget constraint: a i p ≤ b i for all i.
We also introduce a new mechanism design constraint to limit the degree of inequality in our allocations. The popular Gini index is used to measure allocation inequality. We set a constant Gini cap g on the Gini index. That is, a feasible allocation's Gini index should never exceed g. The Gini cap is a mechanism parameter chosen by the mechanism designer, with 0 < g < 1. A higher Gini cap implies that we have a higher tolerance on allocation inequality.
The standard way to compute the Gini index is as follows. Let (a 1 , a 2 . . . , a n ) be the allocation. We sort the a i in ascending order to obtain the y i . So y 1 is the smallest value among the a i and y n is the largest value among the a i . The Gini index equals 2
However, there is one issue with the above definition. The whole point of considering the Gini index is to ensure allocation equality. Generally speaking, we want to avoid situations where some agents receive too little while some other agents receive too much. If an agent has a huge budget, to prevent her from receiving too much, the mechanism can simply set an investment cap. That is, any investment beyond the cap is not accepted. On the other hand, if an agent has a tiny budget, to prevent her from receiving too little, we have to reduce the price to accommodate her tiny budget, which may significantly hurt the mechanism performance -after all, an ICO mechanism's goal is to raise money.
Let us consider an extreme example with g = 0.5 and n = 100. Let us assume that 75 agents have 0 budgets and the remaining 25 agents have very high budgets. In this case, there are no feasible allocations. All allocations' Gini indices exceed 0.5. To show this, we note that y 1 = y 2 = . . . , y 75 = 0, so the Gini coefficient becomes
Actually, for any constant g < 1, we can find type profiles that make it impossible to allocate (to meet the Gini cap). We do not wish to simply fail the ICO in these scenarios. Instead, we allow the mechanism to ignore agents who receive nothing from the Gini index calculation. For the above example, if we ignore all 75 agents who receive nothing, then feasible allocation is possible. We focus on the remaining 25 agents, who all have positive budgets. We could simply allocate every agent an equal share (a i = 1 25 ), by setting the price low enough so that every agent can afford 1 25 coin. Equal sharing has a Gini index of 0. Therefore, ignoring agents saves us from infeasible situations. There are two arguments for the flexibility of ignoring agents who receive nothing:
• We are not considering all 7 billion people when calculating the Gini index anyway. People who have not joined the ICO are not fundamentally different from agents who receive nothing in the ICO. • We are able to achieve much higher revenue under this assumption. We can construct example situations where one tiny-budget agent becomes the revenue bottleneck. By not allocating anything to this agent and not including her in the Gini index calculation, we sometimes can increase the revenue by infinite many times.
Formally speaking, for our specific model, we calculate the Gini index as follows: Definition 1 (Flexible Gini Index). We allow the mechanism to pick the number of winners k from a set K. K includes all the allowed winner numbers.
The n − k non-winners all receive nothing, and they are not included in the Gini index calculation.
Let (a 1 , a 2 . . . , a k ) be the allocation for the k winners. We still have that k i=1 a i = 1 and a i ≥ 0. We sort the a i in ascending order to obtain the y i . So y 1 is the smallest value among the a i and y k is the largest value among the a i . The Gini index for k winners is defined as:
Here are a few example setups for K:
• K = {n}: No agents can be ignored. We fall back to the standard definition.
The mechanism can ignore 50%, 40%, . . . , 0% of the agents.
. . , n}: The mechanism picks at least a half of the agents as winners.
K is also the mechanism's parameter. min(K) is the minimum number of winners. We should not allow the mechanism to pick too few winners. Having only one winner leads to a very nice Gini index -it is always 0, but it is also meaningless.
The set of feasible allocations is determined by the allowed winner numbers K, the Gini cap g, the price p, and finally the agents' budgets. If we increase the price p, then every agent's allocation upper limit is reduced. Therefore, the set of feasible allocations either stays the same or shrinks. The total revenue of a mechanism is exactly the price (because we have only one coin for sale). Therefore, to maximize revenue, a natural idea is to push up the price to the point so that any further price increment makes feasible allocation impossible. We propose the Gini mechanism based on exactly this idea.
Informal description of the Gini mechanism: The Gini mechanism does not ask for the agents' valuations at all. The mechanism produces a price based on the agents' budgets alone. We start with an infinitesimally small price and raise the price until any further price increment results in no feasible allocations. At the final price, the feasible allocation is unique subject to tie-breaking.
Formal Mechanism Description
We start with a procedure that will be used as a building block of the Gini mechanism. The procedure answers the following question: given the agents' budgets (the b i ), given the price p and the number of winners k, what is the allocation that minimizes the Gini index?
In the context of the above question, we do not have a Gini cap. Instead, we search for an allocation that minimizes the Gini index. An allocation (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) is feasible if it satisfies the following:
• a i ≥ 0 and a i = 1.
• a i p ≤ b i . a i p is agent i's spending and b i is the budget limit. If a i p = b i , then we say this agent is maxed out.
• At least n − k elements of the a i are 0s.
Without loss of generality, we assume
. . , a * n ) be the feasible allocation that minimizes the Gini index. We first notice that it is without loss of generality to assume 0 ≤ a * 1 ≤ a * 2 ≤ . . . ≤ a * n . The reason is that if we have i < j and a * i > a * j , then swapping a * i and a * j results in a feasible allocation with the same Gini index. This also means that we can set a 1 to a n−k to 0s as we have only k winners.
We then consider only the winners (agent n − k + 1 to n). If agent i is not maxed out (a * i p < b i ), then agent i + 1 must receive the same allocation amount (i.e., a * i+1 = a * i ). For if it is not, we could increase a * i by a small (still affordable by i) and decrease a * i+1 by the same (ensuring that we still have a * i ≤ a * i+1 ). We end up with a feasible allocation with a strictly smaller Gini index.
Furthermore, among the k winners, let t be the agent that is not maxed out with the smallest index t. Agent t + 1 must have the same allocation amount as t. This implies that t + 1 is also not maxed out, which implies that agent t + 2 should also have the same allocation. That is, the only allocation structure we need to consider is
In this allocation, we refer to C as the allocation cap. n − t + 1 is the number of capped agents.
By definition of C, we have bt−1 p < C ≤ bt p , so the above structure can be rewritten into
The total allocation must be 1, hence C must satisfy the following equation:
The only constraint on C is that it serves as a cap, so 0 < C ≤ bn p . The left side of Equation (3) is strictly increasing in C. The only way Equation (3) does not have a solution is when C has already reached bn p but the left side is still less than 1.
If this happens, then we do not have any feasible allocations. For convenience, we define the minimum Gini index to be 1 for this case. When Equation (3) has solutions, the solution is unique. By solving for C, we can find the allocation that minimizes the Gini index, based on Expression (2) . The optimal (Gini-index-minimizing) allocation is unique subject to a consistent tie-breaking rule. The allocation essentially does not allocate to the lowest n − k agents (in terms of budgets). This is the only place where we need tie-breaking. We may simply break ties by favoring agent i over agent j if i > j. The optimal allocation then sets an allocation cap C. All agents below C max out their budgets and all agents at least C can only get C.
Let us then consider the relationship between p and the minimum Gini index, while fixing the agents' budgets and the winner number k. We define g * (p) to be the minimum Gini index for price p.
Proof. When 0 < p ≤ kb n−k+1 , we set C = 1 k and Equation (3) is satisfied and every winner receives the same allocation 1 k , which corresponds to a Gini index of 0.
The Gini mechanism starts with an infinitesimally small price. Proposition 1 basically says that initially feasible allocations must exist if at least k agents have positive budgets, regardless of the Gini cap. 2 The Gini mechanism then increases the price until any further increment results in no feasible allocations. The next proposition guarantees that when the price is large enough, no feasible allocations exist.
Proof. This is based on Inequality (4).
Proposition 1 and 2 together are not enough. How can we determine when we have reached an optimal price p * so that any further increment results in no feasible allocations? Also, we need to prove that p * exists. For example, it could be that the price can increase in [0, 2) without causing infeasibility, but when the price reaches exactly 2, all of a sudden no feasible allocations exist. In this case, technically speaking p * does not exist. It cannot be 2. Of course, in practice, 2 − is fine. We will show that p * always exists. Situations like the above do not occur.
Proof. As we increase p, every agent's allocation upper limit (b i /p) is decreased. So the set of allowed allocations either stays the same or shrinks. Therefore, the minimum Gini index is nondecreasing with the price.
Based on Equation (3), the cap C is continuous in p. The allocation with minimum Gini index (Expression (2)) changes continuously in p. Therefore, the Gini index changes continuously in p.
Combining all propositions, we have the following theorem: Theorem 1. Fixing the agents' budgets and the number of winners k, we define the maximum price p * to be the maximum price where the minimum Gini index is at most the Gini cap g. At price p * , there are feasible allocations. Any increment in p * results in no feasible allocations.
p * exists and the corresponding feasible allocation is unique subject to tie-breaking.
Proof. Based on Proposition 2, if the minimum Gini index at p = n i=n−k+1 b i is at most g, then this is the maximum price. Any higher price results in a Gini index of 1. At this price, the only feasible allocation is that the lowest n − k agents in terms of budgets do not receive anything and the highest k agents all max out.
We then consider situations where the minimum Gini index at p = n i=n−k+1 b i is strictly higher than g. When p = kb n−k+1 , the minimum Gini index is 0, so p * ∈ [kb n−k+1 ,
Given that g * (p) is continuously nondecreasing based on Proposition 3, S contains either one point, or S is a closed interval. In both cases, p * = max S exists. At price p * , the only feasible allocations are the Gini-index-minimizing allocations, which are unique subject to tie-breaking. If an allocation is not Gini minimizing and is feasible, then the minimum Gini index must be strictly below g, which means that the price can still be pushed up due to the continuity between the price and the minimum Gini index.
The maximum price can be calculated via a simple binary search inside the interval [kb n−k+1 , n i=n−k+1 b i ]. Next, we formally define the Gini mechanism. Definition 2 (Gini mechanism). g and K are mechanism parameters. Given the agents' budgets, for every allowed winner number k in K, we find the maximum price p * k where the minimum Gini index is at most the Gini cap g. We then choose the price to be the overall maximum max k∈K p * k . If there are multiple k values with the same overall maximum price, then we break ties by favoring more winning agents. We pick the unique feasible allocation corresponding to the price.
Equilibrium under the Gini Mechanism
In this section, we start the discussion on the agents' strategies. The way we would implement the Gini mechanism in practise is as follows: We announce a time frame for the ICO. During the time frame, the agents can join/leave anytime, and can change their investment amounts (budgets) anytime. (Technically, joining and leaving are special cases of changing budgets.) The Gini mechanism maintains the current price and allocation throughout the time frame. We assume that the time frame is long enough so that at some point, after all interested agents have joined, an equilibrium on the budgets are to be reached. 3 The equilibrium price/allocation eventually become the final price/allocation.
Our discussion involves three closely related concepts:
• We use b M i to denote agent i's true maximum budget. This is i's private information.
• We use b i to denote agent i's reported budget. Agent i can report arbitrary nonnegative budget, including reporting a value above b M i . • We use c i to denote agent i's spending. The spending is always at most the reported budget. That is,
We use b = (b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n ) to denote the current budget profile. We can also call this the agents' current strategies.
We still assume that 0
For every winner number k ∈ K, we use p * k ( b) to denote the maximum price for k winners and budget profile b. The Gini mechanism's price p * ( b) for budget profile b is the maximum over the p * k ( b) for k ∈ K. Now we introduce a few propositions, which will be used for analyzing agents' strategies. Proof. When we increase agent i's budget b i , feasible allocations remain feasible allocations. If previously we can push the price to a certain point, then we still can (and may be able to push the price up even more).
Proposition 5. For any k, p * k ( b) is continuous in every coordinate (every b i ). This also means that p * ( b) is continuous in every coordinate, because the maximum of continuous functions are still continuous.
Proof. We focus on a specific k. If we change b i to αb i for every i, then the maximum price also changes by α times (to offset the change in budgets). Let p be the maximum price. For an arbitrary > 0, to change the price from p to p + , we can increase every b i to b i p+ p . This also means that for a specific i, if the increment in b i is at most b i p+ p − b i , and we do not change the other coordinates (this means less increment in price because the price is monotone in every coordinate), then the price increment is at most . The same argument works for decrement. Proposition 6. Agent i faces a minimum investment amount b min ( b −i ) and a maximum investment cap b max ( b −i ). Both are determined by the other agents' budgets (i.e., b −i ). Agent i's spending is 0 when her budget is below b min ( b −i ) and her spending stays at b max ( b −i ) when her budget grows beyond the cap. In between the minimum and the maximum investment amounts, the price p * strictly increases in i's reported budget.
Proof. We raise i's budget from 0. At some point when her budget reaches b, for the first time she becomes a winner under the Gini mechanism. Due to tie-breaking, it could be that i's budget must be strictly above b for her to become a winner. We ignore this technicality. Once i becomes a winner. That means at the current price, i is a winner in at least one feasible allocation. Let the set of feasible allocations where i is a winner be S i . If i is not capped in at least one allocation in S i , then by increasing i's budget, the cap of this allocation decreases at the current price, which leads to strictly smaller Gini index. This then means the overall price p * should strictly increase as a result. If i is capped in all feasible allocations in S i , then any increment in i's budget has no effect anywhere, this means that i has already reached her maximum investment cap. Proof. If b i is small and i is not a winner, then increasing b i has no effect on the price. If b i is large and i is capped, then again, the increment in b i has no effect on the price. When price stays the same, b i /p * k ( b) is nondecreasing in b i . When b i is a winner and not capped, when increasing b i , the price gets strictly higher. If i's allocation b i /p * k ( b) decreases, then all uncapped agents' allocations decrease. If any agent is capped, then the cap increases. This results in strictly higher Gini index, which makes the allocation infeasible. If no agents is capped,
This also means that the partial derivative of p * ( b) against b i is bounded above by g+3 1−g .
We focus on budget profiles without ties for convenience. In an actual equilibrium, if the budget profile contains ties, then we can simply perturb the budgets infinitesimally to remove ties. We have shown that the price function is continuous, so perturbing the budgets will only change the agents' utilities infinitesimally.
Proof. We focus on a specific winner number k and a specific budget profile
Let z = (n − k) + k 2 (g + k+1 k ) . Let us analyze the derivative with respect to b i when i > z. If b i is already capped under this budget profile, then the derivative is 0. So we only need to consider the situation where b i is not capped. We reduce b i to b i − and change the price from p * to p * − . We consider a new allocation where every other agent's spending stays the same, but i's spending is reduced by . This is still a feasible allocation but may not meet the Gini cap. We consider the Gini index of the new allocation. Let us consider the definition of the Gini index in (1) . For the new allocation, the only change is a reduction in proportion of y i in both the numerator and the denominator. The numerator is multiplied by 2(i − n + k) (the indices are from 1 to k for the k winners in (1)). The denominator is multiplied by k. Since i > z, we have i ≥ z + 1 and
We want the first term of (1) to be at most g + k+1 k to meet the Gini cap. So lowering y i 's proportion only helps this goal. This means that the new allocation also meets the Gini cap. So the overall price should be at least p − . In conclusion, the derivative is at most 1 when i > z.
We then consider i ≤ z. If i ≤ n − k, then i is not a winner and the derivative is 0. We only present the proof for i = n − k + 1. This is the winner with the lowest budget. This budget has the highest impact on the price. b n−k+1 is not capped, for otherwise the Gini index equals 0. Therefore, we can adjust b n−k+1 both up and down. n − k + 1's spending is the same as her budget.
We first consider the case where b z+1 is not capped. We define a few terms (the c i are the actual spendings of the agents):
The first term of (1) is then r = x +y x+y . When the Gini cap is met, r = k 2 (g + k+1 k ). (If the Gini cap is not met, then all k agents spend all their budgets, in which case any change in budget corresponds to a derivative of at most 1.) We use s to denote x + y.
We change b n−k+1 to b n−k+1 + . We consider a new allocation with the following spendings. Agent n − k + 1's spending is increased from b n−k+1 to b n−k+1 + . Other agents from n − k + 2 to z keep their current spendings. The agents from z + 1 to n reduce their spendings by a factor of α.
The first term of the Gini index of this new allocation is then x + +αy x+ +αy . We set α so that this term equals r.
This implies that the new allocation is still feasible given the above α. Since we assume agent z + 1 is not capped, there is room for pushing down the spendings of agent z + 1 to n by multiplying the original spendings by α. The price corresponding to the new allocation is the denominator of the first term of the Gini index, which is x + + αy (under the Gini mechanism, the price is always equal to the total spending). The derivative of x + + αy against equals To maximize the derivative, we minimize y −ry y = y y − r instead. y y is minimized when all b i are the same for i ≥ z + 1. The ratio is minimized to
So y −ry y is minimized to n−r 2 . The derivative is maximized to
The above increases with k, but k is at most n, so the above is maximized to
The above expression increases with n. When n goes to infinity, we have the final upper bound g+3 1−g . When z + 1 is capped, we consider changing b n−k+1 to b n−k+1 − instead. All analysis is almost identical. After the change, α > 1, but if z + 1 and future agents are capped, there is room for increasing the spendings.
Given the above propositions, we demonstrate that for most agents, the strategies are fairly simple. We start with a sufficient condition for an agent to report 0 budget. Proposition 9. If p * (0, b −i ) ≥ v i , then an agent's best strategy is to report a budget of 0.
In experiments, generally we have that p * (0, b −i ) is very close to the p * (b i , b −i ). Our observation is that an agent's impact on the overall price is very limited. This proposition essentially says that if an agent's value is below (about) the current price, then she wants to leave (by setting the budget to 0).
Proof. The price is nondecreasing in the agents' budgets. p * (0, b −i ) is the lowest price i faces by unilateral budget change. If this price is still at least her valuation, then she does not want to invest. Now we provide a sufficient condition for an agent to report her true maximum budget. It is not as simple as, for example, if p * (b M i , b −i ) ≤ v i , then an agent would report her actual maximum. For reporting the maximum budget, an agent's valuation must be slightly higher than the p * (b M i , b −i ). This is to ensure that the utility gain for buying more is always greater than the utility loss caused by price increment for the existing purchase.
, then agent i's best strategy is to report her true maximum budget.
Here, H i = min{b M i , b max ( b −i )}, which represents the highest "effective" budget for agent i. Any higher budget is essentially the same or violates the budget constraint. a M i is i's allocation when her budget is H i .
In experiments, generally we have that p * (H i , b −i ) is very close to p * (b i , b −i ). a M i is generally very small for most agents. For example, if there are 3000 agents in total, then we know for sure that at most 1000 agents can get allocations at least 0.1%. That means for the remaining 2000 agents, we have a M i ≤ 0.001. Let us consider g = 0.6, so g+3 1−g = 9. For an agent among these 2000 agents, if her valuation is at least (about) the current price, divided by 0.991, then she wants to report her true maximum budget.
Proof. Due to Proposition 6, agent i faces a minimum and a maximum investment amount. If her true maximum budget is below the minimum amount, then this agent is irrelevant. We only consider agents who can meet the minimum investment amounts. We use u i (b i , b −i ) to denote i's utility. Let us analyze the derivative of u i against b i when b i is identical to the spending c i . That is, we consider b i in between the minimum investment amount and H i .
In the last two steps, we relied on two facts. One is that due to Proposition 7, a M i is the highest allocation i can get. The other is that the derivative is bounded according to Proposition 8.
We compare the Gini mechanism's revenue against the first-best optimal revenue. The first-best optimal revenue is calculated as an optimization problem, assuming that we know all the agents' private valuations and private budgets. Given a price p, we filter out all agents who can afford p, and then derive the Gini-index-minimizing allocation based on the true maximum budgets. If the Gini index is at most the Gini cap, then p is an achievable price. We solve for the highest p. Theorem 2. Under the following assumptions, the Gini mechanism's equilibrium revenue approaches the first-best optimal revenue with probability 1, as the number of agents goes to infinity. • The agents' private budgets are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution with a positive expectation.
• There is a constant minimum winner number. Above that, all winner numbers are allowed.
Proof. We find a constant integer n 0 so that P rob(b ≥ U/n 0 ) > 0 and n 0 is at least the minimum winner number. n 0 can always be found. There is a positive probability to draw an agent with valuation above U − and budget above U/n 0 . As the number of agents goes to infinity, the probability of drawing n 0 + n 1 such agents equals 1, where n 1 is another constant integer. Among these n 0 + n 1 agents, for at least n 0 of them, the allocation is at most 1 n1 . (For example, there are at most 1000 agents who allocation is at least 1 1000 .) If the equilibrium price is less than U −
then according to Expression (5), these n 0 agents would max out their budgets under the equilibrium. Each of these n 0 agents has a budget that is at least U/n 0 . So at the equilibrium price, only allocating to these agents alone results in an allocation with a Gini index of 0, which means that any equilibrium price strictly lower than U −
is not possible.
(If it is lower, then it should be raised due to the existence of an allocation with 0 Gini index.) Given that and n 1 are arbitrary constants, we have that the equilibrium price can be made arbitrarily close to U . U is obviously an upper bound on the first-best optimal revenue.
Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the Gini mechanism using real ICO data. The selection criteria for our dataset are mentioned in Section 1. Our dataset is compiled based on previous Dutch auction based ICOs. Each ICO dataset contains the agents' budgets and their entering prices to the Dutch auction. In an ICO Dutch auction, even if an agent enters early, she still pays according to the ending price. So for agents with small budgets (who cannot buy all the coins and stop the auction), entering the auction when the price meets the valuation is a reasonable strategy. For this reason, we use the entering prices as the agents' valuations. In our experiments, we also included a list of generated bids. The reason for this is that there are many observing agents whose data are missing from our datasets. An observing agent is someone
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Allocation Real Curve Approximation BL BR Allocation Error Real Curve Approximation Figure 1 : Approximation for the Allocation Curve who has low valuation. The auction ended before such an agent logs her bid. If the dataset contains n agents, then we add in another n generated agents. The generated agents' budgets are sampled from real budgets, and the valuations are just the ending price times a random value from 0 to 1 (drawn according to the uniform distribution).
We numerically compute an approximate Nash equilibrium. We first calculate the first-best optimal price and use it to initialize the budget profile. An agent reports the true maximum budget if her valuation is at least the first-best optimal price, and reports 0 otherwise. From this point on, we go through the agents one-by-one and have each agent update the budget to her best response. We stop when an equilibrium has been reached.
Our experiments involve thousands of agents, which seems very daunting when it comes to equilibrium computation. Fortunately, with the help of Proposition 9 and Proposition 10, we test these two sufficient conditions and find that most agents either report the maximum budget or 0.
For a handful of agents who do prefer to report a budget that is somewhat in between 0s and their maximum budgets, we use numerical simulation to calculate their best responses. We focus on a specific agent i. Figure 1 (Left) shows i's real allocation curve. When i's budget is below a minimum investment amount (denoted as B min in the figure), her allocation is 0. When i's budget grows above a maximum amount (denoted as B max in the figure), her allocation stays the same. In between, her allocation curve is approximately concave: by investing more, i pushes up the price, so the marginal gain gets smaller and smaller. The real allocation curve is unknown to us, so we resort to its approximation in our equilibrium calculation. We use piecewise straight lines to approximate the real allocation curve, by sampling a few allocation values and then connect them together. We call the sampled points the turning points in our piecewise linear curve. To ensure that we end up with a concave curve, we use a linear program to move the turning points slightly up or down. For example, let the y i be the y-coordinates of the turning points (y 0 = 0). The linear program is constructed as follows (the y i are constants and the variables are the y i ):
It should be noted that in our approximation, we used a non-horizontal straight line in between 0 and B min . This is fine because both before or after the approximation, the agents' best strategies do not involve any budget strictly in between 0 and B min . With a concave allocation curve, the agent's utility function is also concave. For example, when the budget is in between B min and B max , the utility curve is just the allocation curve times a constant (the agent's valuation), then subtracts a linear term (the payment). According to [6] , for a n-person game with concave utility function, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium always exist. Our experiments show that after the approximation, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (a deterministic budget profile) is very easy to find.
Our approximation introduces two sources of errors. First, we have the error δ from the linear program. Then, as shown in Figure 1 (Right) , there is error due to using a straight line to approximate the real curve. Let BL and BR be the x-coordinates of two adjacent turning points. The price at BL is lower than the price at BR. For any budget value B in between BL and BR, the allocation is in between B/p(BR) and B/p(BL). The gap is at most B p(BR)−p(BL) p(BL)p(BR) , which is maximized when B approaches the larger budget BR. We go through every adjacent pair of turning points to get the largest error. Given these two sources of errors, our computed Nash equilibrium is not an exact equilibrium. Suppose when we calculate the best response for agent i, the maximum error in terms of i's utility is , then we can only say this agent's response is at most 2 away from the best response (we could be underestimating the actual best response and overestimating the approximate best response).
The experiments are conducted using parameter g = 0.6 and K = { 0.5n , 0.6n , 0.7n , 0.8n , 0.9n , n}. Table 1 shows the decomposition of agents for different ICOs. The data format is "total number of agents = agents who report 0 based on Proposition 9 + agents who report the true maximum budget based on Proposition 10 + agents with nontrivial strategies." As shown in the table, the number of agents with nontrivial strategies are only a handful. Table 2 compares the equilibrium revenue under the Gini mechanism (Gini Rev.) against the first-best optimal revenue (Opt. Rev.). 4 The unit is Ether. For Polkadot, due to numerical error, one agent keeps changing her budget back and forth while the other agents do not change their budgets. The Gini revenue is only changed at the second digit after the decimal point due to this agent's back and forth. Err. represents the maximum utility error. That is, under our equilibrium, an agent's utility is at most this value away from the best response utility. The unit of error is Ether, so it can be quite significant in its absolute value. For Gnosis, 0.141 Ether is worth about 40 USD in November 2019. Err./Budget is the maximum ratio between the utility error and an agent's true maximum budget. For Gnosis, this value is 0.145%. Errors for the other ICOs are significantly better.
